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Summary 
The objectives pursued by governments managing fisheries may include maximizing profits, 
minimizing the impact on the marine ecosystem, or securing employment, which all require 
adjusting the composition of the fishing fleet. We develop a management plan that can be 
adapted to those objectives and allows the regulator to compare the long-run profits 
between the various management options. We apply the model to the case of Northeast 
Arctic cod, and estimate the cost and harvesting functions of various vessel types, the 
demand function, and a biological model to provide key insights regarding the optimal 
management of this valuable fish species. 
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Abstract:   
The  objectives  pursued  by  governments  managing  fisheries  may  include  maximizing  profits, 
minimizing  the  impact  on  the  marine  ecosystem,  or  securing  employment,  which  all  require 
adjusting  the  composition  of  the  fishing  fleet.  We  develop  a  management  plan  that  can  be 
adapted to those objectives and allows the regulator to compare the long-run profits between the 
various  management  options.  We  apply  the  model  to  the  case  of  Northeast  Arctic  cod,  and 
estimate the cost and harvesting functions of various vessel types, the demand function, and a 
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I.  Introduction 
Fisheries management has never been easy, but today’s challenges are larger than ever before. 
Globally, 80 percent of marine fish stocks are maximally exploited or even overexploited (FAO, 
2008), and several stocks have already collapsed (Jackson et al., 2001). At the same time, more 
people rely on seafood as a major source of protein, especially in developing countries (Smith et 
al., 2010). Sustainability may rank high on the policy makers’ agenda, but the profitability of the 
fisheries  sector  does  so  too,  and  the  same  holds  for  employment  opportunities.  As  these 
objectives can never be fully achieved simultaneously, there is a tendency among economists to 
focus  on  one  single  easy  objective  (maximum  economic  rent),  while  deemphasizing  the 
importance of the other objectives (Dichmont et al., 2010; Grafton et al., 2010; Grafton et al., 
2007). Therefore, it has been suggested that successful fisheries management is largely a question 
about transparency and congruency of objectives (Dankel et al., 2008; Hilborn, 2007; Squires, 
2009). In principle, there are two potential ways to give policy recommendations when facing 
multiple objectives; see Banzhaf (2009). The first approach assumes that the relative shadow 
prices of financial, environmental and social objectives are known so that their weighted sum can 
be maximized. The second is that the researcher just presents the trade-offs and leaves it to the 
policy process to decide what actions foster social welfare. 
  In this paper we take the second approach as we analyze how a fishery should be managed 
in the light of  multiple  policy objectives.  We identify the optimal fleet structure for various 
objectives by maximizing economic rent with and without explicit constraints on fleet activity – 
depending on environmental or social considerations. We apply our analysis to one of the world’s 
most important fisheries: the stock of Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Northeast Arctic, along 3 
 
the coast of Norway and in the Barents Sea. This is the world’s largest stock of cod, and the 
history  of  the  Northeast  Arctic  (NEA)  cod  fishery  since  World  War  II  is  one  of  continued 
increases in landings, suddenly giving way to a near collapse of the fishery in 1989. In response 
to the cod crisis, a management regime was introduced that imposed a fishing quota on each 
ocean-going vessel in the industry. The question is how to allocate those quotas most efficiently 
and – even more important – how to set a total allowable catch (TAC) to prevent another cod 
crisis while meeting broader management objectives. Fisheries management in Norway has a 
long tradition and regulations and management objectives have changed considerably over time 
(Årland and Bjørndal, 2002; Hannesson, 2004; Hersoug, 2005; Holm, 1995; Nakken et al., 1996). 
Årland  and  Bjørndal  (2002)  have  identified  the  main  objectives  of  Norwegian  fisheries 
regulations as (i) increasing the profitability of the fisheries sector, (ii) protecting the resource 
base,  and  (iii)  securing  employment  opportunities  in  coastal  communities  to  maintain  the 
settlements along the coast.  
  In this paper we determine the optimal TAC as well as the most efficient allocation of 
individual  catch  quotas  over  the  various  types  of  fishing  vessels  for  various  management 
objectives: (i) we analyze the scenario that the policy maker intends to maximize simply the rents 
from the fishery – harvesting should take place at lowest costs. (ii) we consider the case that a 
policy maker maximizes rents on the condition that only boats are used that have least impact on 
the ecosystem. (iii) we take into account that a diverse fleet is preferred (for the sake of regional 
development and cultural diversity). For all of these objectives, we determine the optimal TAC as 
well as the most efficient allocation of individual catch quotas over the various types of fishing 
vessels for various management objectives including maximization of the rents of cod harvesting.   4 
 
  Although the stock of NEA cod lies within the exclusive economic zones of both Russia 
and  Norway,  we  focus  our  analysis  on  the  Norwegian  fishing  fleet  of  ocean-going  vessels, 
because  it  consists  of  a  wide  variety  of  boat  types  including  trawlers,  factory  trawlers  and 
longliners (Sandberg, 2006; Standal, 2008). Hence, determining the optimal fleet composition for 
the various management objectives is complex. We develop an analytical model to derive the 
optimal levels of biomass and the associated TAC, and estimate all parameters of the model using 
data on the NEA cod fishery. More specifically, we estimate the cost and production functions of 
the various vessel types in the industry (trawlers, longliners and factory trawlers), the demand 
function for cod (to determine how its value changes with quantity supplied), as well as the 
parameters of the growth function of cod. 
  This study has several unique features. First of all, it takes into account the many problems 
associated with estimating the harvesting, cost, growth and demand functions including serial 
correlation and endogeneity. In this respect we improve on the earlier work by Arnason et al. 
(2004) and Kugarajh et al. (2006) in estimating the demand function for cod, and by explicitly 
acknowledging that there are not only variable costs associated with harvesting cod, but that there 
are fixed costs too (Asche, 2009). Second, we combine the empirically estimated functions into a 
model which allows policy makers to infer (i) the steady-state levels of biomass that maximize 
their  objectives  (either  unconstrained  rent  maximization,  or  rent  maximizations  taking  into 
account  environmental  and/or  social  constraints),  (ii)  the  associated  optimal  TAC  and  the 
allocating thereof over the various vessel types, and (iii) the optimal harvest control rule (HCR) 
that informs the decision maker about the optimal TAC and its allocation over the boat types for 
every level of biomass – independent of whether it is the optimal steady-state stock, or not. Third, 
our study also provides a flexible framework to include constraints regarding the supply side of 5 
 
fleet composition – the  fact that  a cost-minimizing long-run strategy  cannot be implemented 
instantaneously, as boats that operate at lower costs cannot replace more costly ones in the short-
run. As a result, our model provides an important bridge between analytical fisheries models that 
have little empirical content, and highly detailed econometric studies that do not deliver any 
direct policy advice. 
  While an optimal allocation between the coastal and the ocean-going fleet has received 
some attention in the literature (Armstrong, 1999, 2000; Armstrong and Sumaila, 2001), the size 
of an optimal individual quota per boat is usually not addressed. This is somewhat surprising, 
given that the question how to allocate a TAC over a certain number of boats is one of the most 
obvious management problems a fishery faces. An exception is Asche et al. (2009) who have 
addressed this question for the Norwegian trawler fleet. In most bioeconomic models individual 
boats do not exist – often costs are estimated at the aggregated level and hence, the fleet can only 
be analyzed as one entity; see Bromley (2009). This is an obvious shortcoming, as increasing and 
decreasing returns to scale operate at the boat level – not at the industry level. It is sometimes 
argued that a policy maker does not need to worry about how to distribute harvesting rights 
because a market for individually tradable quotas will ensure the efficient allocation (Grafton et 
al., 2006; Hannesson, 2004). We would like to note that this is not true for two reasons. First, the 
total quota size to be allocated (via grandfathering, or via auctions) crucially depends not just on 
the benefits of selling cod (in terms of revenues obtained), but also on the costs of harvesting it. 
While the benefits only depend on the quantity supplied to the market (i.e., on the TAC), the 
costs  critically  depend  on  the  composition  of  the  fishing  fleet  as  some  boat  types  are  more 
efficient in catching cod than others. Hence, while a system of ITQs may ensure that actual 
harvesting takes place at minimum cost, we still need to know how the minimum cost solution 6 
 
looks like in order to decide on the level of the TAC itself. Second, even if ITQs result in fishing 
activity that operates at least costs, such an outcome would only be socially optimal if society had 
no other objectives than just minimizing harvesting costs. In reality, broader objectives, such as 
ecosystem  preservation,  the  cultural  value  of  a  diverse  fleet,  or  equity  considerations,  are 
pursued. Therefore, in this case detailed information on the various vessel types is needed to be 
able to determine whether or not certain boat types should be prohibited from purchasing ITQs.
  Management of the NEA cod fishery is inherently complex, and any useful model – as the 
one developed here – has inevitably to sacrifice certain details. First of all, this study ignores 
important ecosystem effects. At the end of the year, the mature fish migrate out of the Barents 
Sea for about 3 months to spawn, returning to the feeding grounds in spring. The cod eggs drift 
up along the Norwegian coast and the immature fish stay in the feeding grounds until maturation 
when  they  start  reproducing.  Obviously  management  could  be  substantially  improved  by 
acknowledging the age-structure and the productivity of the stock (Diekert et al., 2010a; Sumaila, 
1997a). Second, and in a similar vein, the fact that older cod tend to cannibalize on younger cod 
may  have  management  implications  that  are  ignored  here  (Armstrong,  2000;  Armstrong  and 
Sumaila,  2001).  Third,  if  harvesting  pressure  is  very  high  this  may  induce  an  evolutionary 
response  that  leads  to  economic  repercussions  (Eikeset  et  al.,  2010b).  Fourth,  food-web 
interactions with other species are important factors driving the cod stock dynamics. For example 
capelin (Mallotus villosus) and Norwegian Spring-Spawning (NSS) herring (Clupea harengus) 
are two of the most important fish species the cod interacts with (Hjermann et al., 2007). Herring 
feeds on capelin larvae (Gjøsæter and Bogstad, 1998) and is therefore competing with the cod for 
the  prey  species  capelin.  We  ignore  this  effect  in  this  paper,  but  see  (Link  and  Tol,  2006; 
Sumaila, 1997b). Fifth, climate plays also an important role in this ecosystem. If new species 7 
 
immigrate  from  the  south,  this  leads  to  a  new  food-web  structure  (Ottersen  et  al.,  2006). 
Examples of bioeconomic models that have analyzed how climate may affect the management of 
cod are Hannesson (2007b) and Link and Tol (2009). A study that takes both climate change and 
multiple species into account is Eide and Heen (2002). Sixth, climate change may also affect the 
negotiations  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  Joint  Norwegian-Russian  Fishery  Commission.  If  the 
climate gets warmer, this may trigger capelin to migrate further into Russian waters in which the 
cod  may  follow  (Roderfeld  et  al.,  2008).  Our  analysis  does  not  touch  upon  such  strategic 
interactions, as we assume that the management authority in place sets and enforces the quota; 
see  for  examples  of  strategic  games  regarding  the  NEA  cod  fishery,  Diekert  et  al.  (2010b), 
Hannesson (2007a), and Sumaila (1997a; 1997b). 
  This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present an overview of the NEA cod 
fishery.  Section  3  develops  the  optimal  management  plans  for  a  variety  of  management 
objectives.  We  estimate  the  model  in  section  4,  presenting  the  parameterizations  of  the 
production,  cost,  and  demand  functions  as  well  as  of  the  biological  model.  Next,  section  5 
combines the theoretical and empirical results and derives an optimal policy, while section 6 
concludes. 
II.  The Northeast Arctic cod Fishery 
The NEA cod fishery consists of two parts that are geographically separate: the feeding grounds 
in  the  Barents  Sea,  and  the  spawning  grounds  further  south  along  the  coast  of  Norway. 
Norwegians  have  been  fishing  for  over  thousands  of  years  in  predominantly  the  spawning 
grounds because of their proximity to villages and ports. Since the 1930s (and especially after the 
second world war), technological developments facilitated the use of large ocean-going trawlers 
in  the  feeding  grounds  in the  Barents  Sea,  which  resulted in  an increase  in  fishing  pressure 8 
 
(Godø, 2003). Until the early 1970s the number of trawlers steadily increased and landings have 
been as high as one million tonnes per annum – for some years, the harvesting probability for 
individual fish was as high as 70% per year (Eikeset, 2010). 
  In the late 1970s it became clear that the NEA cod fishery was overexploited; see Figure 1. 
In  1977  the  Norwegian  government  responded  by  starting  to  actively  enforce  the  country’s 
exclusive economic zone and by barring the entry of new trawlers (Standal and Aarset, 2008). 
Also,  a  cap  was  introduced  on  the  total  amount  of  cod  caught  per  year  (the  so-called  total 
allowable catch, or TAC). Unfortunately, the TACs in the 1980s were too lenient to prevent the 
cod crisis that occurred in 1989 – especially because the cod was under severe stress already due 













































Figure 1. The data on total landings (dotted line) and corresponding total biomass (solid line) 
of Northeast Arctic cod from 1949-2007. Data are obtained from ICES (International Council 
for the Exploration of the Seas)  
 9 
 
As a consequence the TAC in 1989 had to be reduced dramatically with disastrous consequences 
for  the  cod  fishing  industry  (Hersoug  et  al.,  2000).  To  deal  with  the  crisis,  a  system  was 
introduced that gave each ocean-going vessel in the industry a quota to catch a certain amount of 
cod. These quotas were non-transferable at first, but later on the regulations were revised to allow 
vessels to transfer harvesting rights (Hersoug et al., 2000; Holm and Nielsen, 2007; Standal and 
Aarset,  2008).  Currently,  the  fishery  is  managed  by  the  Joint  Norwegian-Russian  Fishery 
Commission as the feeding grounds of NEA cod (in the Barents Sea) are located in the exclusive 
economic zones of both countries.  
 
III.  The optimal management of the cod fishery 
We assume the government aims to maximize the net present value of economic rents as the sole-
owner of the resource. Because about 90% of the cod is exported, rent maximization can best be 
described  by  maximizing  profits  –  consumer  surplus  can  be  ignored  because  the  Norwegian 
government is likely to attach little weight to the consumer welfare accruing to citizens outside 
Norway (but see footnote 9). However, we acknowledge that society may have broader objectives 
than just maximizing rents from harvesting cod. These other considerations may be related to 
environmental concerns (as some boat types are more damaging to the marine ecosystem than 
others)  or  social-cultural  concerns  (the  desire  to  maintain  a  diverse  fleet  because  of  cultural 
considerations). Therefore, we assume that the government aims to maximize Norway’s rents of 
cod harvesting while it may or may not decide to impose constraints on the type of vessels used 




Deriving an optimal TAC 
We derive the optimal management plan for three different management objectives. First, we 
solve the problem assuming that society chooses to use a fleet that is able to harvest a specific 
amount of cod, the TAC, at least total costs. Second, we consider the case in which society 
imposes  additional  constraints  on  the  fleet  composition  in  order  to  protect  the  marine 
environment by banning trawlers and factory trawlers, since they are deemed more destructive to 
the ecosystem than longliners (Dayton et al., 1995). The third case we consider is the one where 
the  government,  motivated  by  employment  or  cultural  considerations,  decides  to  maintain  a 
diverse fleet by allocating harvesting rights to a variety of vessel types in the industry – as is 
currently done in the Norwegian cod fishery. Throughout the paper, we follow Salvanes and 
Squires (1995) by assuming that all boats of a specific type are identical.  
  The instantaneous flow of economic profits,  , t P  is specified as follows 
( , ) ( ) ( , ), t t t t t X TAC R TAC C X TAC P = -   [1] 
where  t X  is the biomass of cod present in the Northeast Arctic in year t, and  t TAC  is the total 
allowable catch set by the government. Furthermore,  ( ) t R TAC  are the revenues of supplying 
t TAC   to  the  market,  and  ( , ) t t C TAC X   are  the  costs  of  catching  . t TAC   The  cost  function  is 
assumed to be a function not only  of the quantity harvested, but also  of the  amount of  cod 
biomass remaining. The reason is that the returns per unit of effort (for example, the number of 
days spent catching cod) may depend on the density of the fish in the sea (the so-called stock 
effect). Also note that the costs of catching fish are obviously also dependent on the types of 
vessels  used  –  in  other  words,  they  depend  on  the  implemented  policy  concerning  the  fleet 11 
 
composition. In section 4, the empirical estimations show that  0 X C <  and  0. TAC C >
1 Regarding 
the revenue function, we assume a linear inverse demand function for cod:  
, t t P a bTAC = -   [2] 
so that  ( ) ( ) . t t t R TAC a bTAC TAC = -  The optimal control problem the government faces is as 
follows:  
0
max ( , )
t
t t TAC
W e X TAC dt
d
¥
- = P ∫   [3] 
subject to  
( ) , t t t X G X TAC = - ɺ   [4] 
where dots denote time derivatives, d  is the discount rate, and  ( ) G X  is the growth function of 
the cod stock, which is assumed to be logistic: 






  = -  
 
  [5] 
where  r  is the intrinsic population growth rate, and  K  is the maximum amount of cod biomass 
that would materialize in the long run absent harvesting – the so-called carrying capacity. The 
current-value Hamiltonian H is then given by
2
 
[ ] ( ) ( , ) ( ) , a bTAC TAC C TAC X G X TAC j = - - + - H   [6] 
where j  is the co-state variable. 
  Using the dynamics of the resource stock [4] and applying the maximum principle, we 
obtain the following first-order conditions for an optimum: 
                                                 
1 Partial derivatives are denoted by subscripts, and hence  / . X C C X º ¶ ¶  
2 In the rest of the paper we omit time subscripts unless doing so could cause confusion. 12 
 
0 2 , TAC TAC           a bTAC C j = ⇒ = - - H   [7]  
X X C G .    dj j j = - + ɺ   [8] 
To derive the steady-state optimum, we set  0 x j = = ɺ ɺ . Subsequently substituting [7] into [8] we 
have: 
( ) ( )( )






rX K r a C
TAC






   [9] 
As shown in [9], the optimal TAC depends on the cost function, and hence on the composition of 
the fleet – as not all vessel types are likely to be equally efficient in catching cod. While  X C  (the 
stock effect) is transmitted through all vessels that are in operation,  TAC C  (the cost of catching an 
additional tonne of cod) is only transmitted through the marginal vessel type: the type that is the 
last to receive a quota if these quotas are handed out starting with the most preferred type. This 
difference is important if more than one vessel type is in use for catching cod. If only one boat 
type is operated in the cod fishery, deriving  TAC C  and  X C  is straightforward. This may be the case 
because one vessel type outperforms all other types in a specific aspect – one type may be able to 
harvest at lower costs than the others, or one type may have smaller environmental impacts than 
any  of  the other  types.  If, however,  more  than  one  type  is  used  in  the  fishery  (because  the 
government values a diverse fleet because of social or cultural considerations, or because it faces 
constraints regarding the number of vessels of the preferred type), the stock effect  X C  shows the 
impact of having an extra tonne of biomass on all vessels (of all types used) in the fishery.  TAC C  
on the other hand only pertains to the marginal boat type as defined above. Furthermore, because 
the optimal TAC depends on the composition of the fishing fleet, so does the optimal steady-state 
biomass,  which  can  be  determined  by  substituting  [4]  into  [9]  and  solving  for  . X   Having 13 
 
determined the optimal stock and harvesting levels, we can also calculate economic  rent (as 
measured by economic profits). 
  While steady-state biomass and harvest levels are interesting in itself, they are often not 
very  useful  for  management  purposes,  as  in  reality  the  stock  will  never  be  in  steady  state. 
Therefore, we derive a harvest control rule (HCR) that informs the decision maker about the 
optimal TAC for any given stock level. A feedback HCR can be determined relatively easily 
following Sandal and Steinshamn (1997a; 2001); see for applications Arnason et al. (2004) or 
Grafton et al. (2000). From [7] it follows that the co-state variable  j  can be rewritten as a 
function of the state and the control variable (X and TAC, respectively). If the discount rate is 
zero, the Hamiltonian is constant over time, and maximizing the current-value Hamiltonian boils 
down to maximizing the profit flow (as defined in [1]) that can be obtained in a steady state, also 
referred to as the sustainable economic rent 
*( ) X P  (Sandal and Steinshamn, 2001).
3 We thus 
obtain the following analytical feedback rule: 
( )
2









          - ± - - - - - -P                     =   [10] 
see Appendix 1 for the exact derivation. Both 
*( ) X P  and  TAC C  depend on the fleet structure. In 
section 5, we show how much the optimal long-term policy given by [9] and short-term policy 
given by [10] are affected by the chosen fleet structure. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The results in section 5 show that optimal long-run policy is very insensitive to different discount rates. Given that 
discounting is even less important in the short run, a positive discount rate will most likely not have a considerable 
impact on the results; see also Sandal and Steinshamn (1997b).  14 
 
Deriving the optimal quota allocation for each individual vessel type 
Suppose that currently there are Z different types of vessels used in the industry, such as trawlers, 
factory trawlers, and longliners. Furthermore, in this subsection we also assume that boats can 
freely enter or leave the cod fishery at no cost – an assumption that will be relaxed later. The total 
allowable catch of the vessels of type  z ,  [1,.., ] z Z Î , in year t is denoted by  , zt TAC  and the sum 
of  these  type-specific  allowable  catches  should  add  up  to  the  TAC  as  determined  by  the 
government for that year (that is, 
1 ).
Z
t zt z TAC TAC
= =∑  The production process of a vessel of type 
z is described by a Cobb Douglas harvest function. Here, the amount of cod harvested in year t 
( ) zt h  is a function of both that vessel’s effective fishing effort  ( ) zt e  and the total amount of cod 
biomass( ) t X : 
z z
zt z t zt h q X e
a b = ,   [11] 
where  z q  is a catchability coefficient,  z a  is the stock-output elasticity and  z b  is the effort-output 
elasticity. All parameters are boat type-specific, and  z a  and  z b  reflect the percentage increase in 
harvests resulting from a one percent increase in the relevant input. In section 4 we show that for 
all boat types,  1 0. z z b a > > >   Finally,  zt e  is measured by the number of days  catching cod 
multiplied by the vessel’s Gross Real Tonnage (GRT). That is, effort is measured in efficiency 
units – tonnage days. 
  Regarding the costs of catching cod, we distinguish between fixed costs and variable costs. 
Fixed costs include adjustment costs, such as changing the vessel’s gear to make it suitable for 
catching cod, but also the fuel spent on sailing to the cod fishing grounds, etc., while the variable 
costs are the costs incurred on the days that the vessel is actually catching cod. We use  z f  to 
denote the fixed cost components while the variable costs of effort are assumed to be constant 15 
 
and equal to  z v . Hence, the annual costs incurred by a vessel of type z spending  zt e  tonnage days 
catching cod in a year are given by 
zt z z zt c f v e = + .  [12] 
Let us first determine, for each vessel type z, the optimal effort level per boat 
*
z e , and also the 
optimal number of boats 
*
z n , if the aggregate amount of cod to be caught by all boats of type z is 
equal to  z TAC  (that is,  ).
z z
z z z z n q X e TAC
a b =  The Lagrangian of the cost minimization problem is 
as follows: 
( ) ( ),
z z
z z z z z z z z z z n v e f TAC n q X e
a b l F = + + -   [13] 
where  z l  is the shadow price of harvesting an extra tonne of cod by increasing the fleet size or 
the size of the quota per boat. The first order conditions associated with [13] are 
0,
z z z
z z z z z z
z




= + - =
¶
  [14a] 
1 0,
z z z
z z z z z z z
z
n v n q X e
e




   [14b]
  0.
z z z
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For future reference, it is convenient to note that [14a] implies that the shadow price is equal to 










=   [15] 
Next, combining [14a] and [14b] we find that the optimal amount of effort per vessel per year is 















  [16] 
This  efficient  scale  of  operating  a  vessel  of  type  z  is  the  result  of  two  competing  effects 
associated with increasing the amount of cod harvested. If  z h
 
is increased, the fixed costs of 
adjusting the gear to cod harvesting ( ) z f
 
are spread over a larger harvest, but increasing  z h
 
also 
requires a more than proportional increase in effort  ( ) z e
 
because of decreasing returns to scale; 
see [11]. Hence, the average costs of harvesting cod per vessel are a U-shaped function of effort, 
with its turning point at 
*
z e . Also, note that the efficient scale of employing a boat of type z is 
constant and independent of biomass. Let us now proceed by calculating the costs per vessel 
operating at 
*
z e  tonnage days of catching cod. Using [12] and [16] we have 
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  [17] 
Next, substituting [16] into [14c], we find that the optimal number of boats of type z is equal to  

















  [18] 
The larger the amount of biomass, the more productive is a boat of type z, and hence the fewer 
boats are needed to harvest a specific TAC. So, combining [17] and [18] we identify that the 
harvesting costs of all boats of type z operating at the efficient scale are equal to 
( )
* * , / ,
z
z z z z z z C TAC X n c TAC X
a = =W   [19] 
where 
1 1( / ) ( /(1 )) .
z z
z z z z z z q v f
b b b b
- - W º -  When operating at the optimal scale, the average costs 








= = ɶ   [20] 17 
 
 
Determining the optimal allocation of vessel quotas 
We analyze the case where the government (i) chooses to use a fleet that operates at lowest costs 
(potentially the result of a market mechanism like an ITQ system in which boats of all types are 
allowed to participate) or (ii) takes broader objectives into account and imposes fleet constraints.  
  First, we assume that the government aims to minimize the costs of catching a certain 
amount of cod, the TAC. From [19] it is clear that this would require allocating the entire TAC 
quota to the vessel type that, for the relevant level of biomass, has the lowest average harvesting 
costs,  / ;
z
z z c X
a = W ɶ  see [20]. Let us use subscripts  1 z LC =  to denote the vessel type with the 
lowest average costs,  2 z LC =  to denote the vessel type with the one-but-lowest average costs, 
etc.  More  formally,  1 z LC =   is  defined  as  the  type  for  which  we  have 
1
1 1 / /         {1,.., },
LC z
LC LC z z c X X c z Z
a a = W £ W = " = ɶ ɶ   2 z LC =  is defined as the type for which we 
have  2         {1,.., }\{ 1}, LC z c c z Z LC £ " = ɶ ɶ  and so on.  
  Second, we assume that governments may pursue objectives other than just pure financial 
profit  maximization.  While  pure  cost  minimization  may  dictate  0 z TAC =   for  all  1 z LC ¹ , 
considerations  other  than  the  concern  for  financial  cost  minimization  may  result  in 
0 z z TAC TAC q = >  for at least some  1 z LC ¹  too. Rather than to solve the optimization problem 
taking these considerations into account, we just assume that the government chooses a specific 




= = ∑   and  then  determines  the  optimal  TAC  within  these  quotas 
constraints  z z TAC TAC q = .  
  This approach allows the government to calculate the costs associated with imposing an 
allocation of quotas other than the allocation that minimizes harvesting costs. The difference in 18 
 
economic profits indicates the costs to society for not using the cost-minimizing vector of shares 
so that these costs can subsequently be compared, explicitly or implicitly, to the environmental or 
social benefits obtained, to decide whether the benefits of these decisions exceed their costs. 
While allocation of quotas between several fleet types is not necessarily cost-minimizing (as it 
may be determined by other policy objectives than just maximizing financial welfare), the quota 
allocation within a fleet is still assumed to be optimal – and given by the number of tonnage-days 
boats spend catching cod 
* ( ) z e . For any given vector of shares  z q  and TAC, from [19] we have 
that the total harvesting costs are then equal to  
( )
*
1 ( , ) / .
z Z
z z z C TAC X TAC X
a q
= = W ∑   [21] 
Note that [21] allows the government to calculate the (marginal) harvesting costs for all possible 
management  objectives.  In  case  it  attempts  to  maximize  fleet  profits,  the  cost-minimizing 
allocation can be recovered from [21] when setting  1 1 LC q =  and  0       {1,.., }\{ 1}. z z Z LC q = " =  If 
environmental concerns play the key role, [21] gives the associated cost function setting  1 z q =  
for the boat type that is considered least harmful (and zero shares to all other vessel types). In 
short, the government can simply insert the vector of harvesting shares it deems optimal into [21] 
to obtain the associated harvesting cost function. 
 
 
Optimal quota allocation in case of fleet lock-in  
In the previous sub-section, we have shown that it is cost-minimizing to use only the vessel type 
that has the lowest average costs. In practice, one is typically confronted with a situation where 
boats  of  a  specific  type  cannot  easily  replace  vessels  of  a  different  type.  Instead,  the  fleet 19 
 
composition can only be changed in the short run at substantial costs – a situation which we will 
refer to as a fleet lock-in. In this sub-section, we analyze how to allocate a TAC if there are 
maximally  z n  vessels of type z available in the industry. We keep the assumption that boats can 
be employed in a different fishery, but the maximum number of vessels of type  z  is given by  . z n  
In that case, [16] and [18] can only be implemented if 
*
z z n n £ . The cost-minimizing policy in 
case of lock-in can then be derived as follows. First, one needs to calculate the maximum amount 
of cod that can be caught by the vessel type with the lowest average costs ( 1) z LC =  when all  z n  
boats of that type are run at their efficient scale 
1
*
LC e  (as given by [16]): 
( ) ( )
1
1 *
1 1 1 1 .
LC
LC
LC LC LC LC TAC X n q X e
b a =   [22] 




LC e  In that case, it is optimal to have each individual boat being run at its efficient scale, 
and that means that the TAC should be divided equally over 
*
1 1 LC LC n n £  vessels (see [18]), and 
none to any other boats. If, however,  1, LC TAC TAC >  it is cost-minimizing to increase the quotas 
of boat type  1 LC  because, by definition, these boats have lower average costs than boats of other 
types ( ) 1 2 . LC LC c c < ɶ ɶ  Therefore, the quota of the  1 LC n  boats of type LC1 should be increased until a 
switching  point 
1
** ,










LC LC LC LC
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it  is  only 
profitable to use the first boat of type  2 LC  if imposing higher effort on all  1 LC n  boats of type 
1 LC  results in average costs higher than the minimum average costs of type LC2. 
 
In practice, 
that point may never be reached because there is a maximum limit on effort that can be exercised 
per boat given by  1
MAX
LC e  (if only because a year has 365 days). Hence, the manager should not use 20 
 
boats of type  2 LC  if   
1 LC TAC TAC £  where   
1 LC TAC  is defined by the maximum harvesting level 
achieved  by  1 LC n   boats  of  type  1 LC   running  at  a  scale  equal  to  { }
**
1 1 1 min ,
MAX
LC LC LC e e e = ⌢
.  If 
 



















If   
1 LC TAC TAC > , boats of fleet type  2 z LC =  will also be used. As long 
as 
*
2 2 LC LC n n £ , it is optimal to operate these vessels at their efficient scale (see [16]), and hence 
( ) ( )

























If the TAC is even higher and all boats of the fleet type 
2 z LC =  are in use, effort levels  1 LC e  and  2 LC e should both be increased (if possible) until the 
average harvesting costs of boats of all three types  ( 1,  2,  3) LC LC LC  are equal. We repeat these 
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IV.  An empirical application of the Northeast Arctic cod fishery 
In this section we estimate the production and cost function from individual vessel data from the 
Directorate of Fisheries (Bergen, Norway). Next, since the NEA cod fishery is not a small scale 
fishery, its landings affect the price at which Norway exports cod – and hence also the landing 
prices. We empirically derive the percentage decrease in the landing price (or ex-vessel price) 
resulting from a one percent increase in the quantity of cod harvested – i.e., the inverse of the 21 
 
price elasticity of demand, sometimes also referred to as the price flexibility. Finally, we estimate 
the biological model for the NEA cod stock. All data sources are described in Appendix 3. 
 
Estimating the production and the cost function 
To estimate the cost and production functions of the various boat types, we use panel data from 
the period 1990-2000, which covers almost all ocean-going vessels that were active in the cod 
fishery in that time period. We have data on the quantity of cod harvested, days spent on catching 
cod and on the costs incurred per year for 107 trawlers, 25 factory trawlers, and 85 longliners. 
Most vessels have not reported for all of the 11 years; see Sandberg (2006) for more information 
on the data. Table 1 gives descriptive statistics of the data that will be used in the regression 
analysis.  
 
Days fishing cod  62° N Days fishing in total Days on sea  Cod harv. 62° N in tonnes GRT Total costs in NOK
Trawlers
 Mean 81.2 252.6 283.2 782 280.3 12 mln
 Median 79.0 260.0 294.5 768 298.0 12 mln
 Maximum 278.0 374.0 364.0 2882 499.0 32 mln
 Minimum 2.0 42.0 112.0 3 33.0 0.52 mln
 Std. Dev. 45.3 67.0 49.5 526 89.7 4.8 mln
Factory Trawlers
 Mean 50.5 181.5 181.5 1398 776.9 34 mln
 Median 47.0 182.0 182.0 1303 660.0 34 mln
 Maximum 122.0 299.0 299.0 4495 1428.0 57.7 mln
 Minimum 8.0 37.0 37.0 150 473.0 15 mln
 Std. Dev. 26.4 45.9 40.7 829 307.9 7 mln
Longliners
 Mean 46.5 218.0 310.7 306 216.2 12 mln
 Median 43.0 217.0 318.0 291 202.0 11 mln
 Maximum 134.0 342.0 356.0 874 688.0 28 mln
 Minimum 10.0 106.0 207.0 109 100.0 2.6 mln
 Std. Dev. 20.7 44.7 27.0 150 82.1 4.5 mln  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the annual data used to estimate the cost and production 
function. The data covers the period from 1990-2000, and has been obtained from the 
Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. 
 
In  economics,  the  relationship  between  inputs  and  output  (the  production  function)  is  often 
inferred by estimating a cost function  ( , ) z C X TAC  using a flexible form. This approach is based 22 
 
on the assumption that whatever amount of fish a boat has caught, it has done so at minimum 
cost. In such a case duality applies (Varian, 1992, Chapter 6) and the production function can be 
inferred from the prices of the inputs and outputs. The advantages of this approach are that one 
does not need to assume a certain technological structure a priori (as we did in [11]) and also that 
it is statistically more efficient because the cost function and the first-order condition for cost 
minimization can be estimated jointly. In fisheries economics, this approach is less appealing 
because of several reasons. First of all, the standard cost function approach cannot be applied 
because  one  of  the  inputs  in  the  production  process,  biomass,  cannot  be  chosen  freely  by 
individual  fishermen,  and  introducing  quasi-fixed  factors  in  the  cost  function  typically 
complicates  the  estimation  procedure  considerably  (Morrison,  1988;  Morrison  and  Schwartz, 
1996; van Soest et al., 2006). Second, fishermen are unlikely to always operate at minimum costs 
at  all  times.  Markets  are  usually  incomplete,  fishermen  face  informational  constraints,  and 
payments  of  all  inputs  are  not  always  determined  by  market  prices  directly  because  crew 
members may receive shares of the harvesting revenues rather than a fixed wage (McConnell and 
Price, 2006; Sandberg, 2006). Finally, it is not necessarily the case that all fishermen always try 
to maximize profits because other considerations (including status seeking) may also play a role 
(Gezelius, 2007; Ginkel, 2009; Holland, 2008; Poos, 2010; Salas and Gaertner, 2004). Because of 
these reasons it is preferred to estimate the technical relations [11] and [12] separately rather than 
using a cost function that assumes fishermen choices to be optimal (i.e. cost-minimizing). This is 
in line with Felthoven and Morrison Paul (2004) who argue that “fishing technology [should] be 
analyzed directly (through a “primal” approach), by focusing on inputs and outputs, rather than 
by  modeling  choices  based  on  costs,  profit,  or  market  prices.”  Therefore,  we  estimate  the 
production function [11] and the input cost function [12] separately. As a robustness checks, we 23 
 
have estimated them jointly assuming duality to hold, but the results were judged to be inferior 
compared to the primal approach; see Appendix 2. 
 
Estimating the production function of the three vessel types 
First, we estimate the production function for each fleet type z given in [11]. Table 1 shows that 
the ocean-going cod fleet consists of three types: trawlers (47.8% of the boats), factory trawlers 
(18.5%), and longliners (33.7%). We denote these three boats types by z = T, z = FT, and z = LL, 
respectively. In our model, effort  izt e  is defined as the number of days a boat is fishing cod north 
of  62  degrees  latitude,  multiplied  by  its  size  (GRT).  Including  the  size  of  the  boat  takes 
differences in operational intensity into account (Asche  et al., 2009). We cannot rule out an 
omitted  variable  bias  –  caused  for  example  by  differences  in  the  skillfulness  of  individual 
skippers (Sandberg, 2006; Squires and Kirkley, 1999). This poses a particular problem if the 
“skipper effect” is positively correlated with the size of the boat, which may be the case if the 
best skippers run the largest boats. Therefore, we estimate the model by means of Ordinary Least 
Squares  (OLS)  with  fixed  effects  on  the  cross-sections  (that  is,  we  use  vessel-specific  fixed 
effects). As our number of cross-sections is much larger than the number of years, we use a 
robust  variance-covariance  matrix  that  produces  panel  corrected  standard  errors  (PCSE),  as 
proposed by Beck and Katz (1995). We estimate [11] for each boat type separately, thus allowing 
all parameters to be vessel type specific:  
log( ) log( ) log( ) log( ) , izt z z t z izt iz izt h q X e a b u e = + + + +   [24] 
where  izt e  is an error term, while  iz u  is the estimate of the fixed effects. The latter sum up to zero 
when  aggregating  over  all  boats  of  type  z,  and  hence  iz u   can  be  interpreted  as  individual 24 
 
deviations from the average catchability coefficient log( ). z q  The regression results are presented 
in Table 2. The stock-output elasticity  z a  is estimated to be 0.58 for trawlers, 0.38 for factory 
trawlers,  and  0.22  for  longliners.  The  effort-output  elasticity  z b   is  estimated  to  be  0.85  for 
trawlers, 0.89 for factory trawlers, and 0.92 for longliners. These coefficients are similar to the 
ones found by Kronbak (2004).
4 
 
Trawlers Factory Trawlers Longliners
α: stock-output-elasticity 0.58 (0.08) 0.38 (0.11) 0.22 (0.09)
β: effort-output elasticity 0.85 (0.05) 0.89 (0.06) 0.92 (0.08)
log(q) -7.39 (1.56) -3.29 (2.31) -0.54 (1.88)




Total observations 348 157 226
Number of boats 84 22 64  
Table 2. Regression output for the production functions of the three vessel types. The 
standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
 
Estimating the cost function of the three vessel types 
We estimate the fixed and variable costs of harvesting cod (as specified by [12]) as follows. The 
available cost data for each vessel contains expenses made for fuel, salt and packing, social costs, 
wages, vessel insurance, other insurance, vessel maintenance, gear and equipment maintenance, 
provisions,  vessel  depreciation,  and  a  category  “other  costs”.  In  total,  there  are  11  cost 
components, which are indexed k = 1 … 11. Total costs incurred by vessel i of type  z  in year t 
are given by the vector of nominal cost components,  izkt C  which are subsequently corrected for 
                                                 
4 Eide et al. (2003), however, find an effort-output elasticity of larger than one, which is unexpected for a demersal 
fish stock. This result may be explained by the fact that they use daily data, where effort is given by hours of 
trawling – diseconomies of scale do not necessarily materialize at the very short term. 25 
 
inflation using the Producer Price Index  t PPI . We calculate the part of the total costs incurred 
for catching cod by the share of days vessel i spends on catching cod in the total number of days 
vessel i is fishing at sea. Using index j to enumerate these nine fish species (with cod being j = 9) 
and using  izjt D  to denote the number of days in year t that vessel  i of type  z  catches species j, 
















  [25] 
To estimate [12], we use [25] as the dependent variable and regress it on an intercept as well as 
on the number of tonnage-days vessel i spent harvesting cod in year t. As before, we use fixed 
effects and panel corrected standard errors to estimate 
0 1 2 , izt z z izt zi izt c a a e a e = + + +    [26] 
where the intercept  0z a  equals the fixed costs per boat operating in the cod fishery ( ) z f , while  1z a  
reflect variable costs per tonnage-day spent fishing cod ( ) z v . The coefficient for the fixed effects 
2zi a  can be interpreted as individual deviations from  0 . z a  Table 3 shows the estimation results. 
 
Trawlers Factory Trawlers Longliners
Fixed adjustment costs in million NOK 1.55 (0.21) 2.89 (0.74) 0.28 (0.15)
Variable costs  per tonnage-day in  NOK 131.66 (8.55) 218.49 (17.98) 239.38 (15.21)




Total observations 348 157 226
Number of boats 84 22 64  
Table 3. Regression output for the cost functions of the three vessel types. The standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. 
 
The variable costs for one day of fishing cod are 36,960 Norwegian Kroner (NOK) per trawler 
(of average size 280 GRT), 169,386 NOK per factory trawler (of size 777 GRT), and 51,863 26 
 
NOK per longliner (of size 216 GRT). The fixed costs per year are 1.55 million NOK per trawler, 
2.89 million NOK per factory trawler, and 0.275 million NOK per longliner. We have performed 
robustness checks to validate our results by splitting the total costs into variable and fixed costs in 
an ad hoc way and compared them with our findings here; see Appendix 2.   
 
The inverse price elasticity of Northeast Arctic cod 
Estimating the inverse demand function for cod (see [2]) is complicated, because the price and 
quantity data are equilibrium outcomes of market interactions, and hence are the result of both 
demand and supply. In particular there may still be supply effects if (i) the manager decides on 
the TAC in an ad hoc manner and may set higher quotas when world prices are high, (ii) there is 
a tendency to harvest illegally when prices are high, or (iii) the quotas are not fully exercised 
when prices are really low. Because of these reasons we use Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), 
instrumenting for landings in the first stage of 2SLS using biomass levels of the past two years as 
instruments. 
  We estimate the inverse elasticity of demand – the price flexibility – using export-prices. In 
the NEA-cod fishery, ex-vessel prices and export prices are co-integrated (Asche et al., 2002), 
and therefore one can use the price flexibility to construct a demand function for the ex-vessel 
fish market. While in our theoretical model we assume the demand function for cod to be linear, 
econometrically it is preferred to estimate the demand function using a log-linear specification. 
Hence, our regression model is 
21 22 23 24  log( ) log( ) log(Inc ) log(S ), t t t t P a a H a a = + + +   [27] 
where  t P is the deflated price of cod (in NOK),  t H  are the total landings of the whole stock of 
NEA cod,  Inct  is disposable income (given by real GDP in Europe), and  St  is the price of a 27 
 
substitute product (saithe (Pollachius virens)).
5 The time series for landings and biomass suffer 
from  autocorrelation.  We  therefore,  estimate  [27]  as  an  ARMA(1,1)  process.  Following  Fair 
(1984), the lagged values of    t P and    t H  will added to the list of instruments; see also Pindyck 
and Rubinfeld (1991). We obtain the following estimates: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
log 21.87 0.50log 1.95log Inc 0.50log ,
s.e.             5.41    0.1                0.35                0.12
t t t t t P H S u = - - + + +
 
( ) ( )
1 1 0.31 0.80 ,
s.e.    0.62       0.91    
t t t t u u ε ε - - = - + +
 
with an adjusted R² of 0.97 and a Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic of 1.27. We find that the inverse 
price elasticity is 0.5, i.e. if the supply of cod increases by 1%, the world price drops by 0.5%. 
The Durbin-Watson statistic suggests that we may not have fully succeeded in solving the issue 
of autocorrelation. As a further robustness check we have estimated the same model in different 
specifications (see Appendix 2). These additional estimations support an inverse price elasticity 
of around 0.5. From [2], the inverse price elasticity is given by  ( / )( / ) / , t t H P dP dH bH P =-  
which should equal 0.5. Using the inflation-corrected average price per kilogram of cod between 
1997 and 2007 of 12.59 NOK, and the annual average landing of cod of 527,815 tonnes, we find 
8 1.19 10 . b
- = ×  Substituting this value of b, together with the price and quantity data, into [2], we 
find  18.88. a =
6
 Hence, the price of a kilogram of cod is given in our model as:  
8 18.88 1.19 10 . t t P H
- = - ×   [28] 
                                                 
5 Due to constraints in the fishing process, it seems unlikely that fishermen can substitute saithe for cod – at least not 
in the same way consumers do. If they could, using saithe in the demand function would be problematic (as it may 
measure a supply effect). The size of the coefficient and robustness checks in the Appendix suggests that this is not a 
serious problem.  
6 Using not average prices and landings, but the price in a specific year gives slightly different values for  a  and b  
around our estimate. If one is particularly interested in a specific year, it would obviously be better to use these year-
specific estimates. 28 
 
 
The biological model 
We use a discrete version of the biological model (see [4] and [5]) to estimate the population 
growth function for the NEA cod: 
2
1 0 1 0 0 1 , t t t t t t X X H a X a b X e - - - - + = + +   [29] 
where the error term  t e  is expected to follow an autoregressive (AR) process. Here,  0 a  yields the 
point estimate for the intrinsic population growth rate r, and  0 b  is our point estimate for 1/ . K  
Concerning  serial  correlation,  three  different  models  are  considered:  model  M1  is  estimated 
without an AR term, M2 is estimated as an AR(1) process, and M3 is estimated as an AR(2) 
process. The results are presented in Table 4. The model with the lowest AIC gives a carrying 
capacity ( ) K  of 5.41 million tonnes and an intrinsic growth rate ( ) r  of 0.55. These estimates are 
similar  to  the  results  obtained  by  Kugarajh  et  al.  (2006).  Hence,  [5]  reads  as 
( ) 0.55 1 .
5.41
X
G X X   = -  
   
The total biomass that supports a maximum sustainable yield (MSY) 
thus equals  5.41/ 2 2.7 =  million tonnes of cod, and the associated MSY is equal to 743,000 
tonnes. 
Model M1 M2 M3
r 0.54 (0.06) 0.55 (0.09) 0.56 (0.08)
K
-1 (in 10
-7 tonnes) 1.78 (0.2) 1.85 (0.34) 1.87 (0.31)
AR(1) 0.25 (0.15) 0.31 (0.14)
AR(2) -0.18 (0.14)




AIC 28.39 28.37 28.38
Total observations 61 60 59
 
Table 4. Regression output for the biological model. The standard errors are presented in 
parentheses. The data covers the period 1946-2007. 
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V.  Using the empirical results for an optimal policy 
We can now use the estimates obtained in section 4 to derive the optimal quota sizes per vessel of 
each type, the optimal amount of biomass, and the associated economic rents as indicated in 
section 3. We start by calculating the optimal scale of operation (as measured in tonnage-days) 
for each of the three vessel types (see [16]), and also the optimal number of fishing days (by 
dividing [16] by the average GRT of the boat type). We find that the optimal number of days 
fishing cod for the three boat types varies between 62 for longliners and 238 for trawlers; see 
Table  5.  This  is  more  than the  time  the  boats  spend currently  catching cod  (see  Table  1)  –  
consistent  with  intuition  because  the  current  situation  is  most  likely  characterized  by 
overcapacity.  
 
Trawlers Longliners Factory Trawlers
Optimal tonnage days 667122 134514 1070196
Optimal days 238 62 138  
Table 5. Optimal number of days fishing cod for different boat types, as measured by days 
and tonnage days. 
 
We now turn to the question how to set an optimal TAC. First, we present results for the situation 
where the fleet composition is flexible, and without an upper limit on the number of boats that 
can be used. We start by calculating the average costs of harvesting one kilogram of cod for each 
of the three vessel types, as given by [20]. At a given level of remaining biomass equal to X, the 
costs  equal 
0.58 1,327,706/ T C X =   for  trawlers, 
0.22 955/ L C X =   for  longliners,  and 
0.38 23,557/ FT C X =  for factory trawlers. Multiplying these numbers by  z TAC  gives the total costs 
of all boats belonging to one fleet type; see [19]. Furthermore, we find that trawlers have always 30 
 
lower average harvesting costs than factory trawlers (when both are operating at their efficient 
scales),  for  all  levels  of  biomass  between  0  and  K.
7  Similarly,  trawlers  have  lower  average 
harvesting costs than longliners, as long as biomass is 530,000 tonnes or higher. In the analysis 
that follows, it is shown that if biomass is below this level, it will be desirable to stop fishing 
altogether. Therefore, we can conclude that – if fishing takes place – trawlers are always the cost-
minimizing option; LC1 = T. 
  Next, we use our model to determine the optimal long run equilibrium values for biomass, 
TAC, and fleet profits for the various management objectives; see Table 6. Three scenarios will 
be compared. First, the government minimizes fleet costs and allocates all quotas to trawlers 
(potentially through an ITQ mechanism). Second, the government not only cares about economic 
rents but pursues environmental objectives too. In this scenario the government therefore only 
allows  longliners  to  enter  the  cod  fishery,  as  they  are  more  environmentally-friendly  than 
trawlers.  Third,  we  solve  for  the  case  where  the  government  also  has  other  objectives  (like 
cultural and social considerations), embodied by assuming that society prefers a diverse fleet as it 
is today.
8  
  The results are presented in Table 6. First, we find that discounting has a negligible impact 
on optimal long run policies – the optimal biomass levels for a discount rate of zero percent are 
less than two percent smaller than for a discount rate of ten percent. Second, independent of the 
fleet composition, we find that the optimal biomass is always larger than the MSY stock of 2.7 
                                                 
7 In our analysis we ignore the fact that factory trawlers create added value by processing the fish on board. That 
means that our regression results underestimate the benefits (or overestimated the costs) from using factory trawlers 
that produce frozen fish fillet rather than raw fish. Therefore, it seems unfair to compare them with the other boats. 
Hence, factory trawlers will be omitted from the rest of the analysis, except in the scenario where a diverse fleet is 
preferred by society.  
8Since our dataset comprises almost all ocean-going vessels that are engaged in the cod fishery, we derive the 
parameters from our dataset. That is  0.478,   0.185,  0.337. T FT LL q q q = = =  31 
 
million tonnes of cod. Hence, search costs and market power outweigh the impact of discounting 
(even when using a discount rate of 10%), as the optimum is always on the right hand side of the 
logistic growth function. Third, we find that the optimal biomass is smallest in the case fleet 
profits are maximized and the cheapest boats – trawlers – are used (and hence the amount of cod 
caught is largest). And the remaining biomass is largest in case of environmental concerns, when 
the government only allows cod harvesting to take place by longliners.
9 Our results are similar to 
results obtained for the same cod stock by Armstrong (1999), who found a TAC of 650,000 
tonnes to be optimal and Armstrong and Sumaila (2000) who found an optimal TAC of 450,000 
tonnes. 
 
Management objective Discount rate Biomass  Harvests Profits
(mln tonnes) (mln tonnes) (bln NOK)
Maximizing rents 0% 3.94 0.59 4.86
Environmental concerns 0% 4.35 0.47 2.84
Fleet diversity 0% 4.12 0.54 3.97
Maximizing rents 10% 3.89 0.60 4.86
Environmental concerns 10% 4.34 0.47 2.84
Fleet diversity 10% 4.09 0.55 3.96  
Table 6. Optimal steady-state biomass and harvest levels for several harvesting scenarios for 
maximizing rents (using only trawlers), environmental concerns (using only longliners), and 
cultural diversity (using trawlers, factory trawlers, and longliners). 
 
                                                 
9 Recall that we assume the government to maximize economic profits (with or without constraints on the type of 
boats used) because more than 90% of NEA cod is exported. If the government not only cares about economic 
profits but also about consumer surplus (and hence aims to maximize social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus 
and economic profits, the optimal steady-state biomass is 3.14 mln tonnes with an associated TAC of 0.72 mln 
tonnes (trawlers), 3.33 mln and 0.70 mln tonnes (longliners), and 3.20 and 0.72 mln tonnes (mixed fleet). For the 
HCR, we find that maximizing profits leads to somewhat smoother harvesting activity than maximizing the sum of 
profits and consumer surplus (as harvesting is continued at lower biomass levels, but not as aggressive at higher 
biomass levels). Then, the minimum biomass levels would be around 1.5 million tonnes. 32 
 
So we find that the optimal biomass levels are much higher than the biomass levels that we are 
currently experiencing; see Figure 1. This raises the question how the optimal transition path 
looks like – as given by the HCR [10]; see Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. The derived TAC (total allowable catch) as a function of total biomass given by the 
optimal harvest control rule for using only trawlers, longliners, or a mixed fleet. 
 
First, we find that the optimal HCR is concave: a one percent decrease in the remaining biomass 
calls for a more than proportional decrease in the quantity harvested. Second, we find that the 
minimum  biomass  level,  below  which  all  fishing  activities  should  be  ceased,  is  higher  for 
trawlers than for longliners – as trawlers are getting relative inefficient at low biomass levels (see 
the stock-output elasticity in Table 2). Third, we find that at higher biomass levels, it would be 
optimal to harvest more with a fleet of trawlers compared to longliners. Fourth, we find that just 
allowing longliners to enter the fishery is quite expensive as the annual profits are 2 bln NOK 33 
 
smaller than in case the fishery is managed to maximize rents, and allowing for a diverse fleet 
reduces profits by 0.9 bln NOK. Hence, the manager needs to decide whether the benefits of 
pursuing environmental objectives or cultural objectives exceed these costs. 
  The  minimum  biomass  levels  we find  are similar  to  the  ones  found  by  Arnason  et al. 
(2004), who start fishing at 1.3 million tonnes of biomass, and Kugarajh et al. (2006) who found 
it optimal to start fishing at around one million tonnes of biomass. In these studies, harvesting 
was  never  higher  than  around  500,000  tonnes  (Arnason  et  al.,  2004)  and  750,000  tonnes 
(Kugarajh et al., 2006). 
  If the situation is characterized by fleet lock-in, it is not necessarily possible to follow the 
cost-minimizing policy identified in Table 6. If the optimal TAC of 590,000 tonnes needs to be 
harvested using trawlers operating at their efficient scale, 206 vessels are needed. Let us analyze 
how to allocate the TAC in the most efficient situation if the fleet comprise of only 90 trawlers 
and a large number of longliners.
10 Plugging in all estimated parameters into [20] we find that it is 
cheapest to let trawlers operate 365 days a year, before using longliners if biomass levels are 
above 600,000 tonnes (cf. [23]). Therefore, if the manager aims to maximize the rents from cod 
harvesting, she should force all 90 trawlers to operate the whole  year. In addition, it is then 
optimal to also have 97 longliners active in the cod fishing industry, each of which operates at its 
efficient scale (see the third line in equation [23] and Table 7). Surprisingly, the optimal amount 
of biomass is then larger than when using just trawlers or longliners (and hence the TAC is 
smaller, given that the optimal biomass lies on the right hand side of the logistic growth curve); 
compare Tables 6 and 7. The explanation for this counter-intuitive finding is that using additional 
longliners will negatively  affect the efficiency of trawlers through the stock effect. At lower 
                                                 
10 This example is somewhat stylized, since in reality the TAC is also caught by international vessels that are not part 
of the Norwegian fleet.  34 
 
biomass levels, trawlers are getting less efficient than longliners (see the estimates of the stock-
output  elasticities  ( ) z a   presented  in  Table  2,  and  [9]).  This  indirect  cost  explains  why  it  is 
optimal to use less longliners – given that the trawler fleet is already operating at maximum 
capacity.  
 
Discount rate Biomass  Harvests Profits # Trawlers # Longliners
(mln tonnes) (mln tonnes) (bln NOK) (number of vessels) (number of vessels)
0% 4.42 0.44 4.34 90 97
10% 4.40 0.44 4.34 90 119  
Table 7. Optimal steady state biomass and harvest levels for the case of cost-minimization 
harvesting if the fleet is characterized by a lock-in. 
 
VI.  Discussion and conclusions 
In this paper we developed a management plan to determine the optimal steady-state biomass, 
TAC, and the associated economic rents for three different management objectives for the NEA 
cod fishery. Our model allows the decision maker to determine the optimal allocation of a TAC 
over the various types of vessels currently used in the fishery (trawlers, longliners and factory 
trawlers).  Having  derived  the  associated  cost  functions  of  catching  cod,  the  information  can 
subsequently  be  used  to  determine  the  optimal  steady  state  level  of  biomass,  as  well  as  the 
harvesting  trajectory  towards  it  (the  so-called  HCR).  All  equations  of  the  model  have  been 
estimated  using  detailed  data  of  the  NEA  cod  fishery,  while  addressing  the  many  statistical 
difficulties associated with them. 
  Our analysis shows that fleet structure is important for optimal policy as it determines not 
only how many boats optimally harvest a given TAC, but also the size of the overall TAC and the 
associated optimal biomass levels. Taking the cost structure of the industry into account affects 35 
 
the optimal biomass levels substantially, as the steady-state stock is 3.94 million tonnes in the 
case the government aims to maximize long-run financial welfare (implying that the fishing fleet 
should consist of trawlers only, because they are most efficient in harvesting) while it is 4.35 
million  tonnes  if  the  government  aims  to  maximize  long-run  profit  while  limiting  the  fleet 
structure to consist of longliners only – as they are indicated to impose least damages to the 
marine ecosystem. These results can be used by the decision maker to decide how to set an 
optimal TAC, to choose which vessels are allowed to participate in the fishery, and assess the 
costs of deviating from the least-cost approach.  
  Some  model  assumptions  deserve  special  attention,  as  they  may  have  potential  policy 
implications. First, we assume cod growth to be represented by a simple logistic growth model. 
Adding more biological realism may alter our results; see Eikeset et al. (2010a) for a study that 
uses a more complex biological model to determine optimal HCRs. While the way in which the 
cost structure of different vessel types affect the management plan would carry over to a more 
complex biological model, the specific optima – such as the size of optimal biomass or the TAC 
–  will  probably  be  different.  Second,  we  focus  our  analysis  on  cod  harvesting  ignoring  all 
economic and ecological interactions with other fish species (Nøstbakken, 2006; Salvanes and 
Squires, 1995; Squires et al., 1998). An interesting further avenue would be to investigate how 
the economies of scale that we identified in this paper relate to economics of scope (i.e. the 
possibility to catch other fish species). Third, we assume that each fleet can be represented by a 
typical boat. In reality, a fleet comprises many boats that differ in age, size, productivity, and 
costs.  This  is  not  accounted  for  in  our  model,  giving  rise  to  inefficiencies  when  quotas  are 
distributed over boats. These inefficiencies could be eliminated by an ITQ mechanism (within the 
fleet  constraints  that  we  have  outlined),  even  though  the  costs  and  disadvantages  of  such  a 36 
 
mechanism can easily outweigh the potential benefits (Sumaila, 2010). Fourth, while our results 
give optimal quotas in tonnage-days, in practice it would be desirable to hand out the actual 
quotas – transferable or not – as catch shares to remove the incentive to substitute controlled for 
uncontrolled capital. Finally, analyzing the cost of building up and maintaining fishing capacity 
was beyond the scope of this paper, but would be worth exploring.  
  The  study  presented  here  is  novel,  as  it  provides  an  optimal  management  plan  that  is 
flexible and can be adapted to various policy objectives concerning the utilization of the fleet 
going  beyond  cost-minimization.  However,  it can only  be  considered  as  a  first  step  towards 
optimal management of natural resources that recognizes the full array of preferences society 
holds regarding how these resources should be exploited.  
 
 
Appendix 1: Deriving an analytical harvest control rule 
Deriving an harvest control rule (HCR) is fairly straightforward if the discount rate is assumed to 
be equal to 0 ( ) 0 ; d =
 
see Sandal and Steinshamn (1997a; 2001). The current-value Hamiltonian  
of the optimal control problem in section 3 can be written in general terms as follows: 
( ) ( ) , ( ) , X TAC G X TAC j = P + - H   [A1] 
and the associated first-order conditions are 
0 ( , ), TAC TAC            X TAC j = ⇒ =P H   [A2]
  ( ) ( ) ( ) , , X X X     X TAC G X j dj j j d = - ⇒ =-P + - ɺ ɺ H   [A3] 
. X j = ɺ H   [A4] 37 
 
We aim to derive the optimal HCR which is, by definition, a function of the stock of biomass, 
TAC(X). Substituting this generic expression of the HCR into [A1] and taking the first derivative 





¶ ¶   = + + =   ¶ ¶  
ɺ ɺ ɺ ɺ H H
H H   [A5] 
where the latter equality holds because of [A2] and [A3]; see also Sandal and Steinsham (2001). 
That means that the Hamiltonian is constant over time if  0. d =  In that case, maximizing the 
Hamiltonian then boils down to just choosing X to maximize the instantaneous profit flow in 
steady state (Sandal and Steinshamn, 2001):  
*
( ) max ( )
TAC G X X X
= = P = P H   [A6] 
Substituting [A6] and [A2] into [A1], we obtain the following equality: 
[ ]
*( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) . TAC X X TAC X TAC G X TAC P =P +P -   [A7] 
Using the instantaneous profit function [1], the growth function [5] and [A7], we find the optimal 
harvest control rule as presented in [10]. 
 
Appendix 2: Model validations  
Model validation of the production and cost functions 
As a robustness check, we have split total costs into variable and fixed costs, by assuming that 
variable costs contain expenses made for fuel, salt and packing, social costs, provisions, wages, 
and a category “other costs”. We found that the average cost per trawler fishing cod is 36,823 
NOK, per factory trawler 158,452 NOK, and per longliner 47,285 NOK. The fixed costs that are 
assumed to comprise vessel insurance, other insurance, vessel maintenance, gear and equipment 
maintenance, and vessel depreciation are 1.6 million NOK for trawlers, 3.57 million NOK per 38 
 
factory trawler, and 0.75 million NOK per longliner. These estimates are comparable to what has 
been estimated in our regression analysis, even though the fixed costs in the regression analysis 
are somewhat lower, especially for longliners. This may be due to the fact that some costs were 
assumed to be fixed (e.g. maintenance), but in reality those costs are partially dependent on 
effort. Since our regression analysis is able to capture this effect, while the ad hoc composition 
here is not, one would indeed expect the ad-hoc composition to provide lower cost estimates. 
  As a further robustness check we have estimated the relationship of costs and harvests 
jointly  without  using  effort  as  a  variable,  by  combining  [24]  and  [26].  The 
model ( ) 0 1 2 log log( ) log( ) log( ) it t it iz it TC a a X a h u e = + + + +   [A8]
 
is again estimated with fixed effects. The results are presented in Table A1.  
 
Trawlers Factory Trawlers Longliners
a 0 13.67 (1.04) 12.75 (1.83) 8.92 (1.37)
a 1 -0.44 (0.06) -0.39 (0.08) -0.21 (0.06)
a 2 0.81 (0.03) 0.82 (0.05) 0.81 (0.05)




Total observations 437 169 309
Number of boats 107 25 85  
Table A1. The coefficients of model [A8], estimating the relationship between costs, total 
biomass and harvests. 
 
We find a stock-output elasticity smaller than one and an effort-output elasticity smaller than 
zero, which is consistent with our earlier findings. In order to judge the quality of each model, we 
will assess their forecasting ability. Table A2 shows the forecasting ability of the production 
functions [24] and cost functions that are estimate directly [26] compared with the model [A8]. 
All models have been estimated in the period 1990-1995, while the period 1996-2000 has been 
forecasted. The bias proportion indicates how the mean of the predicted time series differs from 39 
 
the original one, while the variance proportion tells us how the variance of the two series differs. 
We find that the models [24], and [26] perform better than model [A8], indicated by the lower 
bias and variance proportion and consequently the higher covariance proportion. 
 
Model Production Cost Jointly Production Cost Jointly Production Cost Jointly
Equation [24] [26] [A8] [24] [26] [A8] [24] [26] [A8]
Bias proportion 0.344 0.258 0.078 0.36 0.089 0.52 0.455 0.248 0.476
Variance proportion 0.013 0.019 0.32 0.12 0.026 0.059 0.012 0.006 0.02
Covariance Proportion 0.643 0.723 0.602 0.52 0.885 0.421 0.533 0.746 0.504
Trawlers Longliners Factory Trawlers
 
Table A2. The forecast ability of models [24] and [26] estimated directly and model [A8] 
estimated indirectly. 
 
Model validations of demand function 
We have estimated the inverse price elasticity under various different specifications to evaluate 
the  robustness  of  our  results.  First,  we  have  estimated  [27]  integrated  of  order  one  without 
ARMA terms. This delivers a slightly lower inverse price elasticity of -0.40 as given by  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2
log 0.0 0.40 log 1.72 log Inc 0.62 log
s.e.            0.06 0.14                2.34                   0.15 , 
with an adj. R²=0.36 and DW=1.92. Instruments for  log  are  log , log .






D = - D + D + D +
D D D  
Furthermore,  the  same  model  has  been  estimated  without  income  as  a  variable,  giving  an 
elasticity of -0.42 and the following results: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2
log 0.03 0.42 log 0.59 log
s.e.            0.03   0.13                0.15 , 
with an adj. R²=0.36 and DW=1.89. Instruments for  log  are  log , log .






D = - D + D +
D D D  
Omitting the price for saithe gives the same results: 40 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 2
log 0.08 0.42 log
s.e.            0.03   0.17 , 







D = - D +
D D D
 
Alternatively, we have re-estimated model [27] without landing as independent variable, but with 
export quantity directly. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
log 19.33 0.61log 1.76log Inc 0.73log S
s.e.             3.29    0.07            0.22                 0.09 , 
t t t t t P Q u =- - + + +
 
( ) ( )
1 1 0.16 0.09
s.e.    1.53       1.50    
t t t t u u e e - - = - + +
  
with an adjusted R²=0.98, DW= 1.90. Instruments for  ( ) log t Q are  ( ) ( ) 1 2 log ,log . t t B B - -  
The estimated elasticity is a bit higher now (0.61), which is not unexpected, because exports 
quantities have a much more direct impact on prices than landings. All in all, we can conclude 
that the estimated inverse price elasticity of -0.50 seems reasonable. 
 
Appendix 3: Data sources 
Equations [24]-[26]: Data for harvests, costs and effort has been obtained by the Directories of 
Fisheries, Bergen, while biomass comes from ICES (2009). The cost data has been deflated with 
the Producer Price index for Norway taking from the OECD, (2008) using the year 2000 as a 
benchmark. The OECD data has been accessed via www.SourceOECD.org/database/OECDStat. 
Equation [27]- [29] and Figure 1: Landings and biomass are taken from ICES (2009). Export 
prices for cod and saithe are inferred from export values and export quantities; see Timmer and 
Richter (2009) for more information on the method. For each export commodity i (“Atlantic cod, 
fresh  or  chilled”,  “Atlantic  cod,  frozen”,  “Atlantic  cod,  salted,  or  in  brine”,  “Cod,  dried, 
unsalted”, “Cod, salted, and dried” a price is calculated by dividing the total value in a given year 41 
 
by the total quantity:  / . it it it P V Q =  A weighted export price is obtained by multiplying each price 
by its value and dividing it by the value of all exports given by 
5 5
1 1 / . t it it it i i P PV V
= = =∑ ∑  The data 
for saithe is given by “Saithe, dried, salted or in brine”. This data was accessed with Fish Stat 
Plus  (FAO,  data  from  “FAO  Yearbook  of  Fishery  Statistics  –  Commodities”;  the  data  was 
collected  originally  by  Statistics  Norway).  These  is  annual  data  for  the  period  1976-2006. 
European  income  is  proxied  by  real  European  GDP  (Maddison,  2010).  The  data  has  been 
corrected for inflation, and has been converted from US Dollar into Norwegian Kroner using 
exchange rates from the OECD (2010). The KG price for cod is given by the off-boat sales prices 
(“Førstehåndspris”) as given by the Directories of Fisheries, Bergen (Fiskedirektoratet, 2007). To 
make the price data comparable with the costs data we have used, again, the producer price index 
from the OECD. The baseline year was as before 2000. The average KG price is the average 
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